Marquette Elder's Advisor
Volume 10
Issue 1 Fall

Article 4

Negotiating for Resident-Centered Care
Eric M. Carlson

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/elders
Part of the Elder Law Commons
Repository Citation
Carlson, Eric M. (2008) "Negotiating for Resident-Centered Care," Marquette Elder's Advisor: Vol. 10: Iss. 1, Article 4.
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/elders/vol10/iss1/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Elder's Advisor by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.

NEGOTIATING FOR RESIDENT-CENTERED CARE
Eric M. Carlson*

BENEFITS OF RESIDENT-CENTERED CARE
INTRODUCTION

If you have ever lived in a nursing home,' or visited a
family member or friend there, you have probably experienced
the opposite of resident-centered care. To an excessive extent,
facility operations are driven by outdated facility policies and
staff convenience, rather than by resident needs and
preferences. 2 This type of facility has given nursing homes a bad
reputation, and made the adjective "institutional" a powerful
pejorative in discussions of long-term care.'
Today, the better nursing homes are adopting "culture
change" to focus more on individual residents and their

* Eric Carlson is Director of the Long-Term Care Project for the National Senior
Citizens Law Center. He graduated from the University of Minnesota summa cum
laude and received his law degree from the University of California at Berkeley.
1. "Nursing home" and "nursing facility" are roughly synonymous -- this
article uses the term "nursing home." The Nursing Home Reform Law sets
standards for any nursing home certified to accept federal reimbursement. In the
federal law, Medicare-certified and Medicaid-certified facilities are termed "skilled
The standards for
nursing facilities" and "nursing facilities," respectively.
Medicare and Medicaid certification are virtually identical. See 42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1395i-3 (West, Westlaw through 2008) (Medicare certification standards), 1396r
(West, Westlaw through 2008) (Medicaid).
2. See generally WILLIAM H. THOMAS, LIFE WORTH LIVING: How SOMEONE
YOU LOVE CAN STILL ENJOY LIFE IN A NURSING HOME: THE EDEN ALTERNATIVE IN
ACTION (1996).

3. See id. at 11-13.
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concerns.4
Although these attitudes are in many ways
revolutionary, it is important to recognize that such residentcentered practices have been required by federal nursing home
law since 1990.6
For example, a resident has a right to personalize his or her
living space, as long as there is no infringement of other
residents' rights.6 A federal guideline explains that "[t]he right
to retain and use personal possessions assures that the residents'
environment be as homelike as possible and that residents retain
as much control over their lives as possible."'
Also, and more importantly, federal law establishes a
resident's right to receive care that is personalized to the
resident's health care needs and individual preferences.8 A
nursing home must complete a full assessment of a resident's
condition within fourteen days after admission, at least once
every twelve months thereafter, and promptly after a significant
change in the resident's condition.9 The assessment must
include certain information specified by the federal Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS); this required
information is referred to as the Minimum Data Set.10 Federal
regulations list eighteen required subject matter areas, including
patterns,
cognitive
routine,
customary
a
resident's
4. See, e.g., Letter from George Grob, Assistant Inspector General for
Evaluation and Inspections, Dept. of Health & Human Servs., to Dennis G. Smith,
Director, Ctr. for Medicaid & State Ops. (March 2, 2005); CULTURE CHANGE IN
LONG-TERM CARE (Audrey S. Weiner & Judah L. Ronch eds., 2003) (devoted to
articles concerning culture change).
5. The Nursing Home Reform Law was enacted in 1987 and became effective
on October 1, 1990. Pub. L. No. 100-203, §§ 4204, 4214, 101 Stat. 1330-182, 1330-219
(1987).
6. 42 C.F.R. § 483.10(1) (2007). The following discussion of nursing facility law
is adapted in part from ERIC M. CARLSON, LONG-TERM CARE ADVOCACY, §§ 2.08,

2.09 (2008).
7. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS, State Ops. Manual: Appendix

PP-Guidanceto Surveyors for Long Terni Care Faciliites, § 483.10(1), availableat
http://cms.hhs.gov/manuals/Downloads/soml07ap-pp-guidelines_1tcf.pdf.
[hereinafter CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., Appendix PP]
8. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1395i-3(b)(2)(A), (c)(1)(A)(v)(I), 1396r(b)(2)(A), (c)(1)(A)(v)(I)
(West, Westlaw through 2008); 42 C.F.R. §§ 483.15(e)(1), 483.20(k)(1)(i) (2007).
9. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1395i-3(b)(3)(C)(i), 1396r(b)(3)(C)(i); 42 C.F.R. § 483.20(b)(2).
10. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1395i-3(b)(3)(A)(ii), (f)(6)(A), 1396r(b)(3)(A)(ii), (f)(6)(A).
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communication, mood and behavior patterns, psychosocial wellbeing, physical functioning, skin condition, and discharge
potential."
The resident's assessment is just the first step - within seven
days, it must be used to prepare the resident's comprehensive
care plan.12 The care planning is done by an interdisciplinary
team that includes the resident's attending physician, a
registered nurse with responsibility for the resident, other
appropriate staff members from the facility, and, most
importantly and to the extent practicable, the resident and/or
resident's family member.13
The care plan sets forth the services that are to be furnished
in order for the resident to attain or maintain his or her highest
practicable well-being, and must include measurable objectives
and timetables.14 Every three months, care plans must be
reviewed and, if necessary, revised.' 5
Care plans must be
implemented by "qualified persons" under "professional
standards of quality."' 6
In care planning, participation of the resident or family
member is key.'7 Care plans should be based not only on
medical expertise, but also on resident preference; under federal
law, a resident has the right "to reside and receive services with
reasonable accommodation of individual needs and preferences,
except where the health or safety of the individual or other
residents would be endangered.""' The regulations expand on
this right, stating that a resident has the right to "[m]ake choices

11. 42 C.F.R. § 483.315(e).
12. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1395i-3(b)(2), 1396r(b)(2); 42 C.F.R. § 483.20(k)(2)(i).
13. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1395i-3(b)(2)(B), 1396r(b)(2)(B); 42 C.F.R. § 483.20(k)(2)(ii).
14. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1395i-3(b)(2)(A), 1396r(b)(2)(A); 42 C.F.R. § 483.20(k)(1)(i).
15. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1395i-3(b)(2)(C) (requiring review of care plan after each
review of assessment), 1396r(b)(2)(C) (same); 42 C.F.R. § 483.20(k)(2)(iii) (same); see
42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1395i-3(b)(3)(C)(ii) (requiring review of assessment at least
quarterly), 1396r(b)(3)(C)(ii) (same); 42 C.F.R. § 483.20(c) (same).
16. 42 C.F.R. § 483.20(k)(3).
17. See 42 C.F.R. § 483.15(b)-(c).
18. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1395i-3(c)(1)(A)(v)(I), 1396r(c)(1)(A)(v)(I); see also 42 C.F.R. §
483.15(e)(1) (substantially similar language).
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about aspects of his or her life in the facility that are significant
to the resident."19 More specifically, each resident has the right
to "[c]hoose activities, schedules, and health care consistent with
his or her interests, assessments, and plans of care." 20
The question is, of course, what is a "reasonable"
accommodation of individual needs and preferences? Neither
the law nor CMS provides much guidance. 21 The CMS Long
Term Care Facilities Surveyor's guidelines list only two
examples, stating that residents who smoke should be provided
with a smoking area even after a facility adopts a new nonsmoking policy, and that a facility should try to schedule
therapy around a resident's favorite television program.22
Despite this lack of specificity, the savvy resident or
resident's family member should not hesitate to cite the
reasonable accommodation requirement to request, for example,
changes in the resident's schedule or meals. 23 In most such
cases, the requested change is well within the facility's capacity
or, if not, it should be.24 If a facility is so thinly staffed that it
must keep residents on an assembly-line schedule, it would be
reasonable to require the facility to increase its staffing ratios.25
Put another way, it would be unreasonable for a resident to
be deprived of such simple privileges as going to bed and
waking up at a time of the resident's choosing. 26 If a reasonable
accommodation requirement is to mean anything, it must give
residents the ability to make such mundane but nonetheless
important choices.2 7

19. 42 C.F.R. § 483.15(b)(3).
20. 42 C.F.R. § 483.15(b)(1).
21. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., Appendix PP, supra note 7, at
483.5-483.75.
22. Id. at § 483.15(b)(3).
23. Id. at § 483.15(e).

§§

24. See id.
25. See, e.g., SARAH GREENE BURGER Er AL., NURSING HOMES: GETTING GOOD
CARE THERE 29 (1996) (short-staffing not a justification for refusing resident's

request to sleep later).
26. See id.
27. See id.
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RESIDENT-CENTERED CARE AND THE CULTURE CHANGE
MOVEMENT
Of course, enactment of a law does not equate to across-theboard compliance, and nursing homes offer a glaring example of
this reality.28
* The Reform Law and its reasonable accommodation
requirements have been in effect since 1990.29
* Federal and state governments are authorized to
enforce the Reform Law, utilizing an enforcement
mechanism set forth in the Reform Law and its
regulations. 0
* The Inspector General of the Department of Health
and
Human
Services,
the
Government
Accountability Office, and other government
agencies frequently have investigated and made
recommendations concerning the Reform Law's
enforcement.31
* Investigative reporters from across the country have

28. See, e.g., U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, NURSING HOME DEATHS:
ARKANSAS CORONER REFERRALS CONFIRM WEAKNESSES IN STATE AND FEDERAL
OVERSIGHT OF QUALITY OF CARE, REPORT NO. GAO-05-78, at 1 (2004).
29. Pub. L. No. 100-203, §§ 4204, 4214, 101 Stat. 1330-182, -219 (1987).
30. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1395i-3(h), 1396r(h); 42 C.F.R. §§ 488.400- 488.456.
31. See, e.g., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVS., NURSING HOME ENFORCEMENT: APPLICATION OF MANDATORY REMEDIES,
REPORT NO. OEI-06-03-00410 (2006); OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., NURSING HOME ENFORCEMENT: COLLECTION OF CIVIL
MONEY PENALTIES,
REPORT
NO. OEI-06-03-00420
(2005);
U.S.
GOV'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, NURSING HOMES: DESPITE INCREASED OVERSIGHT,
CHALLENGES REMAIN IN ENSURING HIGH-QUALITY CARE AND RESIDENT SAFETY,
REPORT NO. GAO-06-117 (2005); OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVS., NURSING HOME ENFORCEMENT: THE USE OF CIVIL MONEY
PENALTIES, REPORT NO. OEI-06-02-00720 (2005); U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, NURSING HOME DEATHS: ARKANSAS CORONER REFERRALS CONFIRM
WEAKNESSES IN STATE AND FEDERAL OVERSIGHT OF QUALITY OF CARE, REPORT No.
GAO-05-78 (2004); OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVS., SURVEY OF PHYSICAL AND SEXUAL ABUSE IN ALABAMA NURSING HOMES,
REPORT NO. A-04-03-07027 (2004); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NURSING HOME
QUALITY: PREVALENCE OF SERIOUS PROBLEMS, WHILE DECLINING, REINFORCES
IMPORTANCE OF ENHANCED OVERSIGHT, REPORT No. GAO-03-561 (2003).
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investigated the enforcement of nursing home law.32
Nonetheless, most nursing homes routinely have
provided essentially facility-centered care, with little
or no concern for individual residents' preferences.33
There are multiple explanations for the Reform Law's lack
of penetration, including consumer unfamiliarity with nursing
homes 34 the political and legal pressures exerted by nursing
homes, and the related weaknesses in government
enforcement.35 Pressure from the outside - i.e., from consumers
and regulators - oftentimes has not been enough to force
nursing homes to comply with the law.36
The culture change movement is one response to the current
state of affairs, and is driven in large part by health care
providers themselves.37 The message to facility operators:
resident-centered care is, for multiple reasons, the right way to
run a business.38 Consistent with the term "resident-centered,"
the emphasis is on the resident rather than the task.39 As human
beings, residents have needs beyond the physical.40 The
resident's mind and spirit should be taken into account, as
should the resident's relationships with staff members and other
residents. 41
In accordance with these central concepts, a culture-change

32. See, e.g., Mary Zahn & Ben Poston, Unsafe Haven: A Watchdog Report On
Troubled Nursing Homes, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, July 27, 2008, at Al, July 28, 2008,
at Al, A7; Andrew Schneider & Phillip O'Connor, Thousands Are Being Killed in

Nursing Homes Each Year; Cases Involving Questionable Care Rarely Are Investigated or
Prosecuted, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 13, 2002, at Al.
33. See THOMAS, supra note 2, at 11-13.
34. See, e.g., ERIC M. CARLSON, NAT'L. SENIOR CITIZENS LAW CTR., 20 Common

Nursing Home Problems -and How to Resolve Them, at5 (2005).
35. See, e.g., TOBY S. EDELMAN, NURSING HOME DECISIONS OF

THE DEPARTMENT

OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES'S DEPARTMENTAL APPEALS BOARD, 2007, at 27-28
(May 2008) (modest remedies imposed in response to serious violations).

36. See id.
37. See, e.g., NAT'L CITIZENS' COAL. FOR NURSING HOME
Change in Nursing Homes: Consumer FactSheet No. 19, 1-2 (2006).
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

REFORM,

Culture
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facility gives a resident greater control in planning care and in
making day-to-day decisions. 4 2 The environment is more homelike; for example, a resident has greater privacy and also has
opportunities for a greater sense of community within the
facility. 43
Increasingly, implementation of culture change also has
focused on the working conditions of nursing home caregivers. 4 4
Under culture change principles, direct-care workers are given
more control over their schedules - instead of being directed to
perform particular tasks at certain times, workers have
discretion to schedule tasks when most appropriate for the
resident and the worker.4 5 Whenever possible, workers are
assigned to the same residents, so that personal relationships can
develop. 46
Also, through work assignments and trainings,
direct-care jobs are designed so that the workers have a career
ladder rather than a dead-end job. 4 7
Culture-change initiatives are appearing across the country,
and two prominent initiatives have close connections to
Milwaukee, Wisconsin (where the Elder's Advisor Symposium
was held). 48 The Wellspring Model involved a consortium of
eleven non-profit nursing homes in eastern Wisconsin. 4 9 The
initiative provided clinical-care training modules for each of the
facilities, in order to transfer knowledge systemically to each
facility and unit. 0 In addition, the facilities' management added
42. Id.

43. See, e.g., Rosalie A. Kane et al., Resident Outcomes in Small-House Nursing
Homes: A Longitudinal Evaluation of the Initial Green House Program, 55 J. AM.
GERIATRICS SOC'Y 832 (2007).
44. See, e.g., Dale E. Yeatts & Cynthia M. Cready, Consequences of Empowered

CNA

Teams in Nursing Home Settings: A Longitudinal Assessment, 47 THE

GERONTOLOGIST 323 (2007).
45. See, e.g., id.; NAT'L CITIZENS' COAL. FOR NURSING HOME REFORM, supra note
37.
46. See, e.g., NAT'L CITIZENS' COAL. FOR NURSING HOME REFORM, supra note 37.
47. See, e.g., Yeatts & Cready, supra note 44, at 323.
48. ROBYN I. STONE ET AL., EVALUATION OF THE WELLSPRING MODEL FOR
IMPROVING NURSING HOME QUALITY, vii (2002); LESLIE A. GRANT, CULTURE
CHANGE IN A FOR-PROFIT NURSING HOME CHAIN: AN EVALUATION 2 (2008).
49. STONE ET AL., supra note 48, at vii.
50. Id. at 2-4.
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culture change components. 5'
The results were encouraging.5 2 A formal evaluation found
measureable improvement in several quantitative measures fewer regulatory deficiencies and pressure sores, and better staff
retention, for example. 3 Also, the researchers found anecdotal
evidence of residents being given more respect and privacy, and
overall gave the initiative a positive review.54
The nursing home chain Beverly Enterprises (now known as
Golden Gate National Senior Care) implemented a culture
change initiative in 2002.51 Beverly Enterprises contracted with
Action Pact consulting of Milwaukee and, in the first stage of the
initiative, pilot-tested the initiative in ten facilities. The second
stage added eighteen facilities, and replaced some consulting
services with in-house expertise.5 7
The initiative focused on five culture change practices:
* Permanent staff assignments of workers to residents;
* Staff awareness of the culture change initiative;
* Leadership from staff members who did not have
formal leadership positions;
* Staff members making good-faith efforts to fulfill
residents' special requests; and
* Staff
members
going
outside
traditional
departmental roles.58
An academic evaluation found positive results.5 1 Initially,
for example, 58.6% of administrators claimed their staff were
willing to meet "special" resident requests; this percentage
increased to 85.6% after six months of the initiative, and

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 12-21.
Id. at 21.
GRANT, supra note 48, at 1.
Id. at 2.
Id.
Id. at 11-12.
Id. at 12-16.
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remained at 82.9% at the twelve month mark.60
Surveys of staff members and interviews with residents
painted a similar picture.6 1 Staff members pointed to increased
resident autonomy in scheduling, meals, and activities. 62 In
interviews, residents similarly reported greater autonomy in
day-to-day matters and cited a heightened sense of dignity. 63
The residents appreciated being called by their preferred names
and treated like adults rather than children. 64 Staff members
were complimented for respecting residents' privacy and for
taking the time to listen.65
NEGOTIATION IN LONG-TERM CARE

NEGOTIATION IN ASSISTED LIVING MODEL

Flexibility in Assisted Living Regulations
In long-term care, negotiation is most often discussed in
reference to assisted living.6 6 In its earliest conception, "assisted
living" denoted individualized care provided in a person's
home.67 The living unit possibly-but not necessarily- would
be part of a larger building. 68 Negotiation would of course be
necessary to arrange for the necessary services. 69
Today, however, assisted living care has been understood

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 15.
at 16-22.
at 16-19.
at 21-22.

66. See, e.g., Joseph Bianculli, Negotiated Risk-An Operational Issue, PROVIDER,
Nov. 1995, at 32; JOSEPH L. BIANCULLI & KEREN BROWN WILSON, NEGOTIATED RISK
IN ASSISTED LIVING 1 (1996).
67. See CTR. FOR EXCELLENCE IN ASSISTED LIVING, Letter from the Chair 2007
ANNUAL REPORT (2007) available at http://www.theceal.org/assets/PDF/CEAL_
Annual-Report2007.pdf.

68. See id.
69. See id.
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for many years as being provided in a long-term care facility. 70
But an emphasis on negotiation persists, since assisted living
regulations are often vague and rely explicitly or implicitly on
negotiation to fill in the blanks left by regulatory frameworks. 7 1
Assisted living is regulated almost exclusively by state law,
which tends to define "assisted living" with language that is
attractive but vague. 72 In Vermont, for example, the definition of
"assisted living residence" claims ambitiously that "[a]ssisted
living promotes resident self-direction and active participation
in decision-making while emphasizing individuality, privacy
and dignity."73 Similarly, New Jersey defines "assisted living"
as "a coordinated array of supportive personal and health
services, available twenty-four hours per day, which promote
resident self-direction and participation in decisions that
emphasize independence, individuality, privacy, dignity and
homelike surroundings." 74 Illinois' language has an even more
ambitious tone, describing assisted living as "a social model that
promotes the [residents'] dignity, individuality, privacy,
independence, autonomy, and decision-making ability and the
right to negotiated risk."75
To be sure, some state-law definitions use less flowery
language, but they can be equally vague. 76 South Dakota
provides an example somewhat extreme in its blandness,
defining an "assisted living center" as "any institution, rest
home, boarding home, place, building, or agency which is
maintained and operated to provide personal care and services
70. See id.
71. See, e.g., ROBERT MOLLICA & KIMBERLY SNOW, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH &
HUMBAN SERVS., STATE ASSISTED LIVING POL'Y xi (1996) available at
http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/96states.htm (states set minimal standards,
assuming that market forces will produce adequate quality of care).
72. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 7102(11) (2001). This article's discussion of
assisted living law adapted in part from ERIC M. CARLSON, Critical Issues in Assisted

Living: Who's In, Who's Out, and Who's Providing the Care, NATL. SENIOR CITIZENS
LAW CTR. 13-16 (2005).
73. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 7102(11) (2001).
74. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-7.15 (West 2007).
75. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 77, § 295.100(a) (LEXIS through Aug. 2008).
76. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-12-1.1(2) (Supp. 2008).
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which meet some need beyond basic provision of food, shelter,
and laundry."77 A more typical-but still vague-example
comes from Georgia, which defines a "personal care home"
(Georgia's term for assisted living) as "any dwelling, whether
operated for profit or not, which undertakes through, its
ownership or management to provide or arrange for the
provision of housing, food service, and one or more personal
services."78
All of these definitions are noteworthy for setting lowestcommon-denominator minimums as to the services to be
provided.7 9
Although the definition may allow or even
encourage more extensive or sophisticated services, the
definitions (and, typically, the state's assisted living
requirements) do not specify that such services must be made
available to residents. 0 In general, the assisted living provider is
free to provide extensive, individualized services, but the
provider is equally free to provide services only at the
regulations' bare minimum.8 '
There are two principal perspectives on the flexibility in
assisted living definitions and standards.8 2
From one
perspective, flexibility is a positive attribute.8 3 It is assumed,
explicitly or implicitly, that regulatory flexibility will allow
facilities to meet resident needs.84 This perspective assumes a
direct-and positive - relationship between flexibility and
quality of care.85

77. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-12-1.1(2) (Supp. 2008).
78. GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 290-5-35-.04(o) (West, Westlaw through 2007).
"Personal services" are defined in turn as including but not limited to "individual
assistance with or supervision of self-administered medication, assistance with
ambulation and transfer, and essential activities of daily living such as eating,
bathing, grooming, dressing, and toileting." GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 290-5-35-.04(p)
(West, Westlaw through 2007).
79. See CARLSON, supra note 72, at 15-16.
80. Id. at 15.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 16.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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From the other perspective, flexibility is more weakness
than benefit, owing to less confidence that assisted living
facilities will use regulatory flexibility for residents' benefit.86
Under flexible regulations, a facility has significant discretion
over the services it will provide and the care practices that it will
Potential problems include consumer confusion,
follow. 7
unexpected evictions, and substandard care. 8
Negotiation as Facet of Flexible Regulatory Scheme
Flexible regulations often are premised on an expectation
that care standards will be negotiated between the facility and
resident (or resident's representative). 9 From this premise, care
standards will be set by the admissions contract rather than the
state law. 0 A good - admittedly somewhat extreme - example

of a contract-focused model is found in an introductory Illinois
regulation that explains the purpose of the state's Assisted
Living and Shared Housing Act:
Assisted living, which promotes resident choice,
autonomy, and decision-making, should be based on a
contract model designed to result in a negotiated
agreement between the resident or the resident's
representative and the provider, clearly identifying the
services to be provided. This model assumes that
residents are able to direct services provided for them
and will designate a representative to direct these
services if they themselves are unable to do so. This
model supports the principle that there is an acceptable
balance between consumer protection and resident
willingness to accept risk and that most consumers are
competent to make their own judgments about the
services they are obtaining. 91
Perhaps the purest example of a negotiation-based model is

86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See id.
89. Id.

90. Id.
91. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 77,

§ 295.100(a) (LEXIS through Aug. 2008).
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Michigan's system for housing-with-services establishments - a
license is not required, and the relevant statutes do little more
than specify certain unremarkable requirements for a contract
with a resident.9 2 More commonly, negotiation-based models
appear in state assisted living law through disclosure
requirements. 93 The premise of these laws is that consumers will
be protected if facilities are required up front to disclose certain
important aspects of the care to be provided.9 4
Is "NEGOTIATION" REALISTIC IN LONG-TERM CARE?
In long-term care policy discussions, one school of thought
focuses on information and consumer decision-making.9 5 Two
prominent researchers, for example, have proposed eliminating
nursing home regulation:
The resources devoted to regulation could instead be
allocated to a more market-based approach that
emphasizes information. Such an approach would
require collecting enough standardized data to provide
consumers with better information on which to base
better-informed LTC [long-term care] decisions. Data
on various types of care could be arrayed to show
measures of quality (of care and life), the nature of the
services provided, staffing stability, and consumer
satisfaction. The information could be disseminated
through Web sites, but it could also be packaged to
92. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.26503 (West Supp. 2008). Michigan also
licenses homes for the aged which, in comparison to housing-with-services
establishments, are subject to more detailed regulatory requirements. See Mich.
Comp. Laws Ann. § 333.20106(3) (2001).
93. CARLSON, supra note 72, at 17.
94. Id. See also ASSISTED LIVING FEDERATION OF AMERICA PUBLIC POLICY
PLATFORM (2004), available at www.alfa.org/i4a/pages/index.cfm?pageid=3325
(referencing "informed choice," and stating that "[flull mutual disclosure helps to
ensure that residents and families are aware of all rights and options for care"); TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 247.026(b)(4)(B) (Vernon Supp. 2008) (statedeveloped standardized disclosure form); 40 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 92.3(14) (West,
Westlaw through Aug. 2008) (same); 13-110-007 VT. CODE R. § 6.11 (West, Westlaw
through Aug. 2007) (required disclosure of services, rates, and admission/discharge
criteria); Patrick A. Bruce, Note, The Ascendency of Assisted Living: The Casefor Federal
Regulation, 14 ELDER L.J. 61, 73-74 (2006) (disclosure requirements in state law).
95. Robert L. Kane & Rosalie A. Kane, What Older People Want from Long-Term
Care, and How They Can Get It, 20 HEALTH AFF. 114, 123 (2001).
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make it readily accessible to case managers. 96
The less extreme view - one more common in long-term
care academia - emphasizes information without positing the
end of regulation. 97 Conversations generally revolve around
nursing homes, due to the astounding amount of facility-specific
data available to consumers.98
Other research, however, points out the limits of an
information-based strategy in the real world.99 Nursing homes
cannot be reduced accurately to a set of numbers, no matter how
sophisticated the measures and, in any case, most consumers are
not in a position to weigh, understand, or even consider much of
the available nursing home information.10
One study
interviewed 306 sets of nursing home residents and family
members.'01 The interviews showed that the -residents and
family members had made few proactive choices.102 Their
decisions generally were not based on the facility's quality, and
were made within a short period of time and with little
information about the facility ultimately chosen.103
This type of inquiry focuses more on how long-term care
04
One researcher, in an essay
consumers actually behave.1
her
experiences
with her mother, points out
organized around
the flaws of a market-focused strategy in long-term care.

96. Id. at 122-23.
97. See, e.g., Vincent Mor, Improving the Quality of Long-Term Care with Better
Information, 83 MILBANK QUARTERLY 333 (2005).
98. See id. Data about any federally-certified nursing facility is available at the
federal government's Nursing Home Compare website, at www.medicare.gov/
NHCompare. The data include 19 quality measures expressed in percentages, such
as the percentage of residents who have pressure sores, are incontinent, have lost
too much weight, or spend most of their time in bed or in a chair. The data is
drawn from individual residents' Minimum Data Set assessments, as well as from
data self-reported by facilities for the Online Survey, Certification, and Reporting
(OSCAR) database.
99. See generally Nicholas G. Castle, Searching for and Selecting a Nursing Facility,
60 MED. CARE RES. & REV. 223 (2003).
100. Id.

101. Id. at 240.
102. Id. at 245.
103. Id.

104. See id.
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From the Capital Beltway to the Ivory Tower, longterm care policy - like the larger health care landscape
- is inspired by market thinking. The answers to every
problem (cost, quality, loss of autonomy) are to be
found in consumer sovereignty.... It's fairy-tale magic,
this market story with Wise Consumer as its hero, and
it revolves around fairy-tale characters. I don't know
any real people, especially frail elders, who are
motivated or think much like homo economicus. When I
read the policy literature on long-term care, I have to
wonder whether the nation might envision better longterm care policy if all the analysts and politicians spent
a little more time listening to their parents and a little
05
less listening to each other.1
HISTORY OF FACILITIES USING CONTRACTS TO TAKE
ADVANTAGE OF RESIDENTS

NEGOTIATED RISK

Negotiated Risk Designed to Release Facilityfrom Liabilityfor
Inadequate Care
From a public policy perspective, negotiation is an
appropriate strategy only if negotiation can be realistically
expected to result in a fair outcome.106 If, however, facilities
have excessive power - due to any combination of resources,
expertise, and practical realities - then a call for negotiation puts
residents at risk.107
Experience shows, in fact, that long-term care facilities have
a history of taking advantage of consumers during the
admissions process.10 This history counsels against an undue
105. Deborah Stone, Shopping for Long-Term Care, 23 HEALTH AFF. 191, 192
(2004).
106. This article's discussion of negotiated risk is adapted in part from Eric M.

Carlson, ProtectingRights or Waiving Them? Why "Negotiated Risk" Should Be Removed

from Assisted Living Law, 10 J. HEALTH CARE L.
107. Id. at 325.
108. Id.

& POL'Y 287 (2007).
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reliance on negotiation models.109
One example is the concept of "negotiated risk" in assisted
living."i0 Negotiated risk originally was envisioned as a means
for an assisted living facility to avoid liability for inadequate
supervision or health care."'
In a 1995 article, a provider
attorney identified "negotiated risk" as "the first buzzword
unique to assisted living."" 2 As the article described, some
facilities were using negotiated risk to limit their responsibilities
for resident care: "Some facilities are squeezing the concept into
the blueprint of written admissions or resident contracts. Others
think that if a resident can be persuaded to accept a particular
service delivery plan, then the facility will be insulated from
regulatory and civil liability." 13
Other provider representatives have made similar
observations.' 14
One provider attorney explains that "[a]
negotiated risk contract is where the resident agrees to accept a
certain setting and they assume the risk that that setting may or
may not be appropriate for their care."" 5 In accordance, a
consulting firm's vice president of clinical operations discusses
how negotiated risk can be used to address areas in which a
facility's care might be inadequate:
109. Id. at 336-37.
110. Id. at 287.
111. Id. at 294-95.
112. Bianculli, supra note 66, at 32; see also BIANCULLI & WILSON, supra note 66, at
1 (negotiated risk is "buzzword specific to assisted living").
113. Bianculli, supra note 66, at 32.
114. See John Durso, Testimony to Comm'n on Affordable Housing and Health
Facility Needs for Seniors in the 21st Century (Nov. 7, 2001), http://govinfo.
library.unt.edu/seniorscommission/pages/hearings/011107/durso.html.
115. Id. See also N.H. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Final Report: H.B. 1319 Negotiated Risk 2 (2000) ("issues sparking the debate on negotiated risk appear to
focus on transferring clients who may wish to remain in a residential placement
environment to which they have grown accustomed when that residence is not
longer able to meet their identified care needs"); Stephanie Kissam et al., Admission
and Continued-Stay Criteriafor Assisted Living Facilities,51 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC'Y.
1651, 1652 (2003) (recommending "managed risk agreement" with liability waiver if
resident remains in assisted living facility beyond point at which facility can meet
care needs); Elisabeth Belmont et al., A Guide to Legal Issues in Life-Limiting
Conditions, 38 J. HEALTH L. 145, 188 (2005) (in negotiated risk "facility attempts to
explain before admittance those services/responsibilities for which it intends to be
responsible, as well as those for which it intends not to be responsible").
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Once residents are assessed, providers should
implement shared-risk, or managed-risk, agreements
for any potential risk identified for the resident, such as
falls, wandering away from the community, or even the
potential for skin breakdown. These vitally important
agreements document that the resident and family have
been advised of the inherent risks that come with
choosing a long-term care model that supports quality
of life, such as assisted living, as opposed to a primarily
quality of care skilled nursing model. Because assisted
living providers may not provide 24-7 care (and are not
expected to), these agreements leave no question that
the resident and the family understand this concept
and accept their share of responsibility in the resident's
plan of care.116
Consistent with these descriptions, negotiated risk
agreements often are portrayed chiefly as a means for an
assisted living facility to reduce its legal exposure." 7 As stated
in an article defending negotiated risk, "For some providers, risk
consultants and lawyers, [liability waivers] are the 'magic
words' of [a negotiated risk agreement] - the words whereby the
resident essentially agrees that the provider is not liable for
harm that arises from the subject risk."" 8 The same article
recommends negotiated risk agreements as a means of reducing
a facility's exposure to liability claims."
In accord, a 2004 article in Assisted Living Today (the
magazine of the Assisted Living Federation of America, or
ALFA) listed a "managed risk agreement" as one of ten
techniques to be used by an assisted living facility to "avoid
costly litigation."120 The article's discussion of managed risk

116. Kendra Case, Shared Risk Starts With Resident Assessment, ASSISTED LIVING
TODAY, Mar. 2002, at 27.
117. See Allen Lynch & Sarah Teachworth, Risky Business: The Enforceability and
Use of Negotiated Risk Agreements, 1 SENIORS HOUSING & CARE J. 3, 10 (2002).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 4 ("the legal exposure borne by long term care providers has been
anything but limited, with the long term care litigation 'avalanche' having crippled
some operators and impacted nearly all through less liability insurance coverage at
a dramatically higher cost").
120. Donna Fudge, Staying Out of Court, ASSISTED LIVING TODAY, Jan./Feb. 2004,
at 18, 20.
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begins with the admonition to "[b]e honest with the resident and
the family that there may simply be unavoidable injuries during
the resident's stay at your community. Do not promise that you
can keep the resident safe."' 21 The article recommends that a
facility consider using contractual clauses that waive the
facility's liability if the resident is injured after failing to wait an
adequate period of time for staff assistance, and that state that
the resident understands that the facility "cannot guarantee that
[the resident] will not experience a fall or an injury from a
fall."' 22
Negotiated Risk Agreements Violate Public Policy and Are
Accordingly Unenforceable
Negotiated risk proponents have turned a blind eye to one
vitally important fact - negotiated risk agreements are not
enforceable.'2 3
Virtually across the board, courts have
invalidated liability waivers that purport to release a health care
provider from liability for negligence.124 "In the field of medical
risks," notes one commenter, "courts have generally rejected
out-of-hand attempts by physicians and hospitals to shift the
risk of negligence to patients."'2 5
In a seminal case, Tunkl v. Regents of University of California,
the California Supreme Court refused to enforce a waiver that
purportedly relieved a university hospital of liability for surgical
negligence.126 The court listed six relevant factors: 1) a business
suitable for public regulation; 2) a service of great public
importance; 3 )a seller willing to perform a service for any
member of the public; 4) a seller with a decisive bargaining
advantage; 5) an adhesion contract; and 6) a buyer under the

121.
122.
123.
124.

Id. at 20 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 20-21.
See Carlson,supra note 106, at 323-34.
Glen 0. Robinson, Rethinking the Allocation of Medical Malpractice Risks
Between Patientsand Providers, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173, 184 (1986).
125. Id.
126. Tunkl v. Regents of the Univ. of CA, 383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1963).
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seller's control.12 7
A finding of unenforceability does not require that all of
these factors be present but, in fact, each factor is present in
negotiated risk.128 Regarding the fourth and sixth factors,
residents and their families are in an extremely vulnerable
position, and tend to follow a facility's instructions.129
To date, there is only one published ruling on this issue; the
ruling supports this article's analysis, finding that negotiated
risk agreements are unenforceable.13 0 A fall in an assisted living
facility had caused a resident to suffer irreversible brain damage
and permanent physical impairments.13 ' Based on the admission
agreement, the facility moved for summary judgment under
assumption of risk.13 2
The relevant admission agreement
language stated:
The Resident acknowledges that these principles of
independence, control, and choice will result in a
higher quality of life for each resident in the
community, recognizes the additional risk that results
from the ability of the Resident to make such choices,
and agrees to mutually accept and share this risk.
Resident agrees that [the facility] shall not be liable to
Resident for personal injuries or damage to property, even if
resulting from the negligence of [the facility] or its
employees, unless resulting from its gross negligence or
willful misconduct. Resident acknowledges that the
independence, control and choice afforded within [the
facility]
requires
that
the
Resident
assume
responsibility for any loss, injury or damage resulting
from Resident's personal actions and conduct.'
The court's analysis distinguished assisted living from
recreational sports, which is the context in which assumption of

127.
128.
129.
130.
2005).
131.
132.
133.

Id. at 445-46.
See Carlson, supra note 106, at 328-29.
See id.
See Storm v. NSL Rockland Place, LLC, 898 A.2d 874, 877 (Del. Super. Ct.
Id. at 878.
Id.
Id. at 878-79 (emphasis added).
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risk has most commonly been applied. 134 "[Tlwo common
themes" were present in the sports-related cases.135 First, the
injured party had chosen "to engage in the activity, not out of
necessity but out of a desire to satisfy a personal preference."' 3 6
Second, the injured party had participated in the activity
knowing that participants might not act with ordinary care. 37
Neither of the common themes was present in the resident's
allegations against the assisted living facility.'38 The resident
had entered assisted living not out of choice but because he
required care due to multiple sclerosis and an alcohol
addiction.139 Also, a recipient of health care cannot agree to less
than "ordinary care":
[T]here is virtually no scenario in which a patient can
consent to allow a healthcare provider to exercise less
than "ordinary care" in the provision of services. Even
if given, a patient's consent to allow a healthcare
provider to exercise less than ordinary care would be
specious when considered against the strict legal,
ethical and professional standards that regulate the
Regardless of whether the
healthcare profession.
patient elects to have healthcare or requires it, the
patient appropriately expects that the treatment will be
rendered in accordance with the applicable standard of
care. This is so regardless of how risky or dangerous
the procedure or treatment modality might be.140
As further support for its ruling, the court cited statutory
and regulatory duties of health care providers generally and
assisted living providers specifically.141 Given the state's interest
in establishing and protecting an adequate quality of care, it was
improper for quality of care to be compromised by individual
agreements between facility and resident.142
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id. at 883-84.
Id. at 883.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 884.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 883-87.
Id. at 885.
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Negotiated Risk Now Promoted, Unfairly, As Enhancerof
Residents' Autonomy
Negotiated risk's core concept - a resident waiving a
facility's liability for inadequate care - has proven unappealing
Also, as discussed
to consumers and policymakers. 4 3
immediately above, this core concept is likely to be found
violative of public policy. 144
Nonetheless, in communications with residents and family
members, assisted living facilities continue to solicit negotiated
risk agreements in which a resident (or resident's representative)
waives a facility's liability.145 But in public policy discussions,
negotiated risk proponents increasingly promote the term
"negotiated risk" as a mechanism allowing a resident to refuse
the facility's offer of services or advice. 14 6 In this gambit,
negotiated risk is justified by inaccurate claims about life in a
nursing home. 147 Allegedly, assisted living facilities follow a
humanistic social model of care, as compared to the prescriptive
medical model in which nursing home staff members have taken
over residents' decision-making.148 One article flatly - but
incorrectly- states: "In a nursing facility, [a diabetic resident]
would not be given the option of eating cake." 4 9
In fact, the example of a diabetic wanting dessert is
probably the most common fact pattern put forward by
negotiated risk proponents.'-" Other common examples are
143. See generally Carlson,supra note 106.
144. Storm, 898 A.2d 874 at 886.
145. Kenneth L. Burgess, Negotiated Risk Agreements In Assisted Living
Communities 14-15 (1999); Paula C. Carder, The Social World of Assisted Living, 16 J.
AGING STUDIES 1 (2002), reprinted in Gray Areas: Ethnographic Encounters with
Nursing Home Culture 263, 278-79 (Phillip Stafford ed. 2003).
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. Id.
149. Carder, supra note 145, at 12.
150. See, e.g., Marshall B. Kapp & Keren Brown Wilson, Assisted Living and
Negotiated Risk: Reconciling Protection and Autonomy, 1 J. ETHICS, LAW, AND AGING
11, 11 (1995) (insulin-dependent diabetic who wishes to eat sweets); Kenneth L.
Burgess, Negotiated Risk Agreements In Assisted Living Communities 56 (1999)
(negotiated risk agreements used for "[d]ietary deviations beyond simply food
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residents who refuse baths151 or medication,152 or insist on selfcare even though staff assistance is available. 153 In general,
under this "against-facility-advice" scenario, the facility is
prepared to provide adequate care, but the resident wants to act
against the facility's advice in a way that increases risk to the
resident.154 The negotiated risk agreement allegedly "describes a
process by which a resident who engages in risky practices, as
identified by a staff member, family member, or health care
provider, signs an agreement whereby he or she indicates
understanding of risks and agrees to accept responsibility for
negative results."'55
The end result is confusion.' 6 As conceded in a leading
article advocating negotiated risk, there is "no consensus among
commentators, regulators and accreditation bodies of what a
negotiated risk agreement actually is - or should be."157 The
confusion is well-illustrated by state negotiated risk laws, which,
in general, are both vague and inconsistent in their treatment of
negotiated risk.'58 Depending on the state, a negotiated risk
agreement purportedly is used to resolve disputes or, instead, to

preferences, such as where medical issues like diabetes are implicated); Lynch &
Teachworth, supra note 117 (negotiated risk agreement used for residents not
following a prescribed diet); Carder, supra note 145, at 12; Paula C. Carder & Mauro
Hernandez, Consumer Discourse in Assisted Living, 59B J. GERONTOLOGY, S58, S61
(2004); Janet O'Keefe et al., Using Medicaid to Cover Services for Elderly Persons in
Residential Care Settings: State Policy Maker and Stakeholder Views in Six States at
27 (2003); David Peete, "Risk Management": Heeding the New Mantra, 50 NURSING
HOMES: LONG TERM MGMT. 56, 56 (2001); Katherine Blanchette, NEW DIRECTIONS
FOR STATE LONG-TERM CARE SYSTEMS VOL. III: SUPPORTIVE HOUSING 19 (1997).
151. Kenneth L. Burgess, supra note 145; see also Allen Lynch & Sarah
Teachworth, supra note 117 (negotiated risk agreement used when resident does not
want to wait for bathing assistance).
152. Carder & Hernandez, supra note 150, at S61.
153. Robert Mollica, State Policy and Regulations, in ASSISTED LIVING: NEEDS,
PRACTICES, AND POLICIES IN RESIDENTIAL CARE FOR THE ELDERLY 9, 22 (Sheryl
Zimmerman et al. eds., 2001) (undressing and bathing); Robert Mollica and
Kimberly Snow, NAT'L ACAD. FOR STATE HEALTH POL'Y, STATE ASSISTED LIVING
POL'Y: 1996 at i (1996) (medication administration).
154. See id.
155. Carder, supra note 145, at 12 (internal quotations omitted).
156. Lynch & Teachworth, supra note 117.
157. Id.
158. Carlson, supra note 106, at 301-17.
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plan care."' The agreement is allegedly designed to reduce the
resident's risk or, on the other hand, to consent to inadequate
care.160 In some states, negotiated risk law leaves open the
possibility of a liability waiver, whereas in other states the law
explicitly bars any liability waivers.'6 1
This confusion is a predictable result of the bait-and-switch
process being followed by negotiated risk proponents.16 2
Negotiated risk was designed as a liability waiver, but the term
"negotiated risk" is now promoted in public forums as an
autonomy enhancement for residents. 6 3
MISREPRESENTATIONS IN NURSING HOME ADMISSION
AGREEMENTS

ConsistentProblems
Nursing home admission agreements provide another
dramatic example of how long-term care residents often are
taken advantage of in purported "negotiation."1 64 Across the
board, studies of admission agreements have found that the
agreements often misrepresent the relevant law and do so in a
way that disadvantages residents.165
This consistent level of misrepresentation is, in part,
explained - but certainly not excused - by most consumers'

159. Id.
160. Id. at 301.
161. Id. at 301-17.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 287.
164. MARYLAND STATE BAR ASSN., SUBCOMMITTEE ON L. & THE ELDERLY,
MARYLAND NURSING HOME CONTRACTS: A MANUAL FOR RESIDENTS AND
ADVOCATES (1987); Kisor, Nursing Facility Admission Agreements: An Analysis of
Selected Content, 15 J. APPLIED GERONTOLOGY 294, 305-06 (1996); Eric Carlson, NAT'L
SENIOR CITIZENS LAW CTR, THINK TWICE BEFORE SIGNING: IMPROPER AND UNFAIR
PROVISIONS IN MISSOURI NURSING HOME ADMISSION AGREEMENTS, 9 (2007)
[hereinafter THINK TWICE BEFORE SIGNING].
165. MARYLAND STATE BAR ASSN., supra note 164; SUBCOMMITTEE ON L. & THE
ELDERLY, supra note 164; Kisor, supra note 164, at 305-06; THINK TWICE BEFORE
SIGNING, supra note 164, at 9-15.
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unfamiliarity with nursing homes and by the difficult
circumstances surrounding many nursing home admissions.166
A California appellate court notes "that admission of a close
family member to a nursing home-usually by the child of a
parent in declining mental or physical health-is often an
emotionally-charged, stress-laden event."167
In the same
opinion, the court found "an admissions process in which a
stack of documents was hurriedly presented with little or no
explanation. 168 Family members were simply directed to sign by
"Xs" or check marks that had "already been added by the
[nursing home] employee handling the admission process."1 69
Authorizing Improper Evictions
The most recent study, published in 2007, was based on an
analysis of 175 admission agreements used by federally-certified
nursing homes in Missouri. 170 Although the Nursing Home
Reform sets just-cause requirements for eviction, seventeen
percent of the agreements authorized eviction without cause. 7 '
Furthermore, of those agreements that set forth justifications for
eviction, forty-six percent misrepresented those justifications.172
Under the Nursing Home Reform Law, eviction is allowed
only for one of six limited reasons. 73 Nonpayment is one
reason; a second reason is the nursing home going out of
business.174 The other four reasons all are based on the resident's
health or behavior.'7 Eviction is allowed if the resident no
longer requires nursing home care (reason #3) or requires a level

166.
1996).
167.
168.
169.

Podolsky v. First Healthcare Corp., 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 89, 101 (Cal. Ct. App.
Id.
Id. at 101-02.
Id.

170. THINK TWICE BEFORE SIGNING, supra note 164, at 1.

171. Id. at 23.
172. Id.
173. 42 U.S.C.A.
174. Id.

175. Id.

§§ 1395i-3, 1396r; 42 C.F.R. § 483.12(d)(2)).
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of care that cannot be provided in a nursing home (#4).176 The
final two reasons protect others in in the nursing home - a
resident can be transferred or discharged involuntarily if his
presence endangers others' health (#5) or safety (#6).'7
These six reasons translate to a general rule that eviction
should almost never be justified by a resident's health care
needs. 178 While some health care conditions may be unpleasant
- dementia is a good example - they rarely endanger others'

health or safety.179 Also, while some health conditions require a
resident's transfer to a hospital, those types of transfers are
almost never contested by a resident. 8 0
Regardless, many of the admission agreements gave
nursing homes broad authority to evict residents due to health
conditions or behavior.18' Pursuant to one admission agreement,
the nursing home's administrator had "the right to remove any
Resident from [the nursing home], after appropriate notice,
when in her judgment it is in the best interest of the other
Residents, [and] for medical reasons as defined by [the nursing
home] or [the nursing home's] physician."18 2 Similarly, another
admission agreement broadly authorized transfer/discharge
"due to mental [or] physical conditions."' 8 ' In still another
agreement, eviction was authorized for a resident being "unduly
disturbing, unduly noisy, objectionably untidy, noncooperative
or destructive in behavior and action," even though such
behaviors are common symptoms of Alzheimer's disease and
other dementias, and nursing homes are designed, in large part,
to care for residents with dementia.184

176.
177.
178.
179.

Id.
42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i-3(c)(2)(A), 1396r(c)(2)(A).
Id.
THINK TWICE BEFORE SIGNING, supra note 164, at 24.

180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.

183. Id.
184. Id. at 23-24.
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Requiring or Soliciting FinancialGuarantees, Despite Federal
Law to the Contrary
Under the Nursing Home Reform Law, a nursing home
cannot require a resident's family member or friend to become
financially liable for nursing home expenses.8 5
This noguarantee rule makes sense because it is not fair to force a family
member or friend to be liable for an unspecified debt that may
run into the tens of thousands of dollars.186 Also, a financial
guarantee is usually unnecessary since the Medicaid program
can step in and pay when a resident's savings have been
depleted.'17
In an effort to evade the no-guarantee law, nursing homes
have used admission agreements in which a family member or
friend supposedly "volunteers" to become financially liable.' 8
Nursing homes have claimed that these guarantee agreements
are legal, arguing that although the Reform Law prohibits a
nursing home from requiring a financial guarantee, it does not
prevent a nursing home from accepting a voluntary guarantee.' 9
These arguments fail, however, for at least three reasons.190
First, such admission agreements are deceptive because they are
generally written to give a family member or friend the
impression that a signer (often termed the "responsible party")
is only a representative or contact person.191 Second, admission
agreements with supposedly "voluntary" guarantees are often
used to require guarantors, in violation of the Reform Law.
Third and finally, a supposedly "voluntary" guarantee is
185. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i-3(c)(5)(A)(ii), 1396r(c)(5)(A)(ii) (2008); 42 C.F.R.
483.12(d)(2).
186. Burgess, supra note 145, at 14-15; Carder, supra note 145, at 1.
187. See U.S.C. § 1396r.
188. Burgess, supra note 145, at 14-15 (ALFA 1999); Carder, supra note 145, at 1.
189. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i-3, 1396r.
190. See THINK TWICE BEFORE SIGNING, supra note 164, at 30.
191. Id.

§
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unenforceable because it provides no benefit to either the
resident or the "responsible party."19 2 Pursuant to the Reform
Law, a guarantee cannot be quid pro quo for the resident's
admission, and the "responsible party" certainly experiences no
personal benefit from taking on financial liability.193
In the Missouri study, nineteen percent of the admission
agreements required a financial guarantee, in direct violation of
the Nursing Home Reform Law.194 For example, one admission
agreement had a "responsible party" agreeing " '[t]o be fully
responsible for all financial obligations incurred by Resident,'
without any similar promise by the resident." 195 More
frequently, financial liability was imposed on both a resident
and a family member or friend. 196
Furthermore, another thirty percent of the agreements
solicited

-supposedly

without

requiring - a

financial

97

guarantee.1
Many of the agreements were ambiguous or
confusing as to whether a resident's family member or friend
was personally liable for nursing home expenses or responsible
only to make payments from the resident's resources. 198 As
discussed above, all of these one-sided, supposedly "voluntary,"
agreements would be unenforceable.199
Improperly Waiving Nursing Home's Liability for Negligent Care
As discussed above in this article's discussion of negotiated
risk, a waiver of liability is generally invalid in consumer healthcare settings.20 0 Courts will not enforce a liability waiver
obtained from a hospital patient prior to surgery.2 0' For the

192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 31.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 30.
Id.
See, e.g., Tunkl, 383 P.2d 441.
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same reasons, a waiver of liability for nursing home negligence
will also be deemed invalid. 202
Nonetheless, in the Missouri study, nineteen percent of the
nursing homes had an incoming resident limit the nursing
home's general liability. 203 Another fifteen percent of the
admission agreements limited the nursing home's liability to
negligence or omission, and still another twenty-eight percent of
the admission agreements included a liability waiver of another
type.204
Some waivers were written extremely broadly; for example,
one agreement claimed that that the nursing home would "not
be held responsible for accidents or injuries sustained by the
Resident during residence in the Facility." 205 With similar
expansiveness, another agreement waived the liability of the
nursing home and "its affiliates or partners, [and] the directors,
officers, employees, or agents of its affiliates or partners, [and]
the directors, officers, shareholders, employees, or agents
thereof." 206 This same agreement specified that the nursing
home would "not be responsible for the criminal acts of its
agents or employees, or third parties." 207
Some agreements limited the damages that could be
awarded, and those limitations could be drastic. 208 For example,
several admission agreements waived all non-economic
damages-such as damages for pain and suffering-even
though the damages suffered by nursing home residents tend to
202. See, e.g., id. (liability waiver for surgery violates public policy); Cudnik v.
William Beaumont Hosp., 525 N.W.2d 891, 895-96 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994) (liability
waiver for radiation violates public policy); Olson v. Molzen, 558 S.W.2d 429, 431
(Tenn. 1977) (liability waiver for abortion violates public policy); Porubiansky v.
Emory Univ., 275 S.E.2d 163, 167-69 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980) (liability waiver for dental
care violates public policy); Ash v. New York Univ. Dental Ctr., 564 N.Y.S.2d 308,
310 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (same); Meiman v. Rehab. Ctr., Inc., 444 S.W.2d 78, 80
(Ky. Ct. App. 1969) (liability waiver for physical therapy violates public policy).
203. THINK TWICE BEFORE SIGNING, supra note 164, at 31-32.

204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 15.
Id.

2008]

NEGOTIATING RESIDENT-CENTERED CARE

49

be overwhelmingly comprised of non-economic damages rather
than economic damages (such as lost wages). 209
Attempting to Improperly Lower Residents' Expectations
The Nursing Home Reform Law sets high standards for
nursing home quality of care. 210 A central provision obligates
nursing homes to provide the care that enables a resident "to
attain or maintain the highest practicable physical, mental, and
psychosocial well-being." 2 11 Although certain conditions are
associated with aging, the Reform Law counsels that they not be
considered inevitable. 212 For example, in regard to pressure
ulcers and other medical conditions, the nursing home is
required to provide preventive services and, if the condition
nonetheless develops, to administer appropriate care and
treatment. 213
Many nursing home admission agreements, however,
present an opposing philosophy. Through explanations of
"reasonable expectations" (or a comparable term), these
agreements have the resident, or resident's representative,
acknowledge that aging is a risky process and that certain
conditions are essentially inevitable. 214
In the Missouri study, twenty-five percent of the admission
agreements contained at least one provision designed to lower
the expectations of residents or their families. 215 The study
identified four categories: 1) acknowledging risks of aging,
2)recognizing the unavailability of "special duty" care, 3)
acknowledging adequacy of the nursing home's staffing, or
4)accepting the nursing home's occasional failure to meet

209. Id.
210. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i-3(b)(2), 1396r(b)(2) (2008); see also 42 C.F.R. § 483.20(k)
(2008) (corresponding requirement in Reform Law's regulations).
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. 42 C.F.R. § 483.25(c); see generally 42 C.F.R. § 483.25 (2008).
214. THINK TWICE BEFORE SIGNING, supra note 164, at 9.
215. Id. at 10.
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standards.2 16
In general, the theme of the "reasonable expectations"
provisions was that residents and residents' family members
must reconcile themselves to facility policies rather than vice
versa.217 For example, one admission agreement had a resident
and representative agree "that if they believe that the Resident is
not receiving the level of care which meets their expectation,"
they had "the right to either pay for additional care through the
use of private-duty personnel or to remove the Resident from
the Facility and place the Resident in another health care setting,
which the Resident/Representative believes would be more
suitable to the Resident's needs." 218
Another illustrative
provision stated:
Service Limitations: The parties hereto agree that the
services provided by [the nursing home] and others
within this facility are not designed to somehow protect
the Resident from everyday, normal risks and
responsibilities of living, including, but not limited to,
such general accidents and situations such as falling,
choking and weight loss and/or dehydration resulting
from a Resident's failure to partake of food and drink.
Additionally, the parties hereto understand that the
services provided by [the nursing home] do not include
24-hour; one-on-one seven (7) days per week
monitoring of its Residents. 21 9
Of course, this theme is completely at odds with the Reform
Law and its requirement that a nursing home provide the care
that is needed for a resident to reach the highest practicable level
of functioning. 220 Also, such provisions appear designed to
waive a nursing home's liability for falling, choking, and other
incidents, and accordingly would run afoul of the rule
(discussed earlier in this article) that health care consumer
contracts not absolve the health care provider from liability for

216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

Id.
Id. at 11.
Id.
Id. at 11-12 (emphases in original).
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i-3(b)(2), 1396r(b)(2).
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negligence. 22 1
A POSITIVE VISION FOR NEGOTIATION IN LONG-TERM
CARE
Consumer negotiation can play a central role in improving
the quality of long-term care. But, much will have to change, for
up to this point negotiation has been largely illusory. As
addressed earlier in this article, assisted living facilities have
taken advantage of regulatory flexibility to push for contractual
provisions that would absolve them from legal responsibility.
And, nursing facilities, despite comprehensive and humane
federal laws, nonetheless have pushed admission agreements
that misrepresent the law to residents' detriment. Clearly, these
supposed negotiations have been less than kind to residents and
their families.
Consumer involvement has been a missing piece in the
The culture-change movement,
long-term care puzzle. 22 2
although of course a positive development, is largely based in
the community of long-term care providers. 2 23 And within that
community, its penetration is far greatest among the alreadygood nursing homes, with significantly less impact among
below-average facilities. 2 24
The relative lack of consumer pressure has been a
significant contributing factor to nursing homes' oftentimes
unsatisfactory quality of care. 22 5 Nursing homes over the years
have operated under a desultory status quo accepted by
consumers as nursing home reality - just the way that things
are. 22 6 Consumer expectations are simply too low. Nursing
homes' "reasonable expectations" strategy is a powerful
221. THINK TWICE BEFORE SIGNING, supra note 164, at 11-12.
222. Carlson et al., supra note 34, at 5.
223. Nat'l Citizens Coalition for Nursing Home Reform, supra note 37, at 1-2.
224. See id.
225. See Carlson et al., supra note 34, at 38; see THINK TWICE BEFORE SIGNING,
supra note 164, at 2-3.
226. See Carlson et al., supra note 34, at 38; see THINK TWICE BEFORE SIGNING,
supra note 164, at 2-3.
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illustration of this problem. 2 27 Through words and deeds, too
many nursing homes have provided the minimum and, worse
yet, have whittled back on what the minimum constitutes. 228
Theoretically, government enforcement could compensate
for consumer pressure, but general consumer passivity
translates also to long-term care being a relatively low priority in
state and federal governments. 22 9 Long-term care facilities have
powerful lobbying arms compared to the consumer

counterforce. 23 0
To a great extent, consumers' lack of power derives from
their overly deferential or intimidated attitudes in day-to-day
interactions within the facility. 231 A resident or family member
thinks: "I'm not a doctor or a nurse . .. I'm sure that the nursing

home knows best." 23 2 A common emotion is fear, and many
family members decide to avoid conflict. "I don't want to say
anything," they reason, "because the staff might take it out

against my mom."

233

More education is needed. 23 4 The reality of long-term care is
not well-understood, particularly because information sources
present such divergent views. 2 35 Consumers are whipsawed
between facility advertisements - full of floral patterns and
expressions of concern for families' "loved ones" - and the news
media's periodic exposis.

227. See THINK TWICE BEFORE SIGNING, supra note 164, at 11.
228. Id.

229. See Carlson,supra note 34, at 5.
230. Id.; In response to the preceding paragraphs, provider representatives
would be quick to cite the residents and family members who do complain, and the
news media that seem to address long-term care issues only in sensationalist,
overly-critical - and oftentimes unproductive - ways. This article does not deny the
fact that some consumers do advocate well for their interests, that news media
occasionally cover long-term care, and that government officials and employees feel
some pressure to "crack down" on poorly performing long-term care facilities. The
point is that this pressure is inadequate and sometimes misdirected, and that as a
result the quality of long-term care is significantly lower than it should be.
231. See THOMAS, supra note 2, at 11-13.
232. Id.
233. Id.

234. Castle, supra note 99, at 245.
235. See id.
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Educational materials must be honest about long-term care
realities, acknowledging that the consumers' task is neither
simple nor easy.2 36 In searching for a facility, it is not enough to
work through a checklist and inquire about facility policies.237
And, even if the consumer has secured admission to a "good"
facility, ongoing advocacy is essential.
Furthermore, but predictably, this advocacy is not easy,
largely due to (as discussed in this article) the situation's
unfamiliarity. 238 The resident or family member is likely to feel
isolated and vulnerable. 23 9 Unmoored from reference points, she
does not know what to expect or demand. 240 Accepting the
inadequate becomes the path of least resistance, whether done
consciously or not.2 41
The key for consumers is to recognize the tendency to settle
for too less but to resist. 242 They must understand that although
their experience may be confounding to them, it is far from
unique. 243 Over the past few decades, millions of residents and
family members have confronted essentially the same
circumstances and experienced similar feelings of confusion,
fear, frustration, and resignation.244
The elder law bar can be a significant part of the solution.
Residents and family members need legal advice on a
comparatively obscure area of law, and elder law attorneys are
uniquely positioned to be both available and knowledgeable.

236. Helpful material includes publications written by two of the Symposium
participants. This article's author has written The Baby Boomer's Guide to Nursing
Home Care (2006) (with co-author Katharine Hsiao) and 20 Common Nursing Home
Problems - and How to Resolve Them (original edition 2005). Dr. Robert Kane, along
with his sister Joan West, wrote It Shouldn't Be This Way: The Failure of Long-Term
Care (Vanderbilt 2005), a revealing first-person account of their difficulties in
working through the long-term care system on their mother's behalf.
237. Kane & Kane, supra note 95, at 123.
238. THINK TwICE BEFORE SIGNING, supra note 164, at 30.

239. Stone, supra note 105, at 194.
240. Id.
241.
242.
243.
244.

Id.
Kane & Kane, supra note 95, at 123.
Id.
See id.
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The attorney can advise the clients, who then negotiate for
themselves, benefiting from the attorney's legal knowledge,
practical experience, and emotional support.
Also, the direct involvement of an elder law attorney can be
an invaluable counterweight to the facility's pressure.2 45 The
attorney may participate directly in negotiations, as may a
paralegal or care manager affiliated with the attorney's firm. An
attorney's presence mandates more careful attention to the
relevant law - the actual law, not the misapprehended law that
facility staff might routinely follow. 24 6 And, of course, adherence
to the governing law generally is a plus for residents and their
families.
There is no denying the fact that much work remains to be
done. Today, too frequently, what passes for "negotiation" is a
process that allows a facility to take advantage of consumers. 24 7
Furthermore, the care provided is more likely to be centered on
facility convenience than on residents' needs and preferences. 248
Nonetheless, the culture of long-term care is gradually
changing, and future improvement will be greatly accelerated if
consumers more consistently engage in real negotiation - before,
during, and after admission. 249 The quality of long-term care is
determined, by and large, by millions of personal interactions
between and among facility staff members, other health care
250
professionals, residents, and residents' family members.
Currently, residents and family members are unduly passive
during a large percentage of those interactions, but an infusion
of knowledge and energy promises to alter first those
interactions and then the culture of long-term care generally. 251

245.
246.
247.
248.

See Podolsky, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 89.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i-3, 1396r.
Carlson, supra note 106, at 336-37.
See generally THOMAS, supra note 2.

249. THINK TWICE BEFORE SIGNING, supra note 164, at 33.

250. Id.
251. Id.

